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RESPONSES
ONE-LEGGED CONTRACTING†
Ian Ayres∗ and Gregory Klass∗∗
Rabbi Hillel was once challenged by a gentile to teach “the whole
Torah” while the challenger stood on one leg.1 The sage responded with
his version of the Golden Rule: “That which is hateful to you, do not
unto another: This is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary.”2 The
story exemplifies both how succinctly a sagacious interlocutor can summarize a vast tract, and the extreme impatience of many listeners.
Professors Robin Kar and Margaret Radin, in their thought-provoking
article Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,3 have proposed
that courts ignore vast portions of contractual writings: the unread
standard terms ubiquitous in modern consumer and other transactions.4
Before enforcing such boilerplate text, a court should “imagine that all
of the written and digital text exchanged during contract formation is
converted into oral form and takes place in a face-to-face conversation
between the relevant parties.”5 It should then ask: “Could this boiler–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
† Responding to Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019).
∗ William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School.
∗∗ Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
We are indebted to Joe Burson for his excellent research assistance on this Response.
1 Philologos, The Rest of “The Rest Is Commentary,” FORWARD (Sept. 24, 2008), https://
forward.com/culture/14250/the-rest-of-the-rest-is-commentary-02564 [https://perma.cc/F9K4MFBP].
2 Id. One of us implemented a version of this one-legged constraint by trying to summarize in
a video everything one needs to know about retail investing while standing on one leg. Ian Ayres,
Concise Advice for Investing While Standing on One Leg, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2016/01/30/hillel-investment-advice/#2e0e477a6b55
[https://perma.cc/N98U-VUCM].
3 Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019).
4 Id. at 1139–40 (citing Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2014)).
5 Id. at 1167.
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plate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conversation that contributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposition that both
parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern language use
to form a contract?”6 If the answer is “No,” the boilerplate “should not
be enforced.”7 Kar and Radin’s standard places particular emphasis on
succinctness. Plausibly contributing to an oral conversation where the
drafter is observing the cooperative conversational norms requires the
drafter “to say neither too much nor too little” given the shared purpose
of the conversation.8
Kar and Radin are asking important questions, and there is much to
admire in their analysis.9 The past century has seen radical changes in
the technologies for entering into contracts, including consumer contracts. If in the early twentieth century many worried about preprinted
forms businesspeople never read,10 today we have shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap. There is a good case that courts, legislatures,
and regulators have not kept up — that the old rules of contract
formation, construction, and enforcement are ill suited to these new
technologies.
But we worry that Kar and Radin’s proposed solution would, in
many contexts, lead to a kind of one-legged contracting. We do not
understand Rabbi Hillel to be saying that the commentary is unimportant or might be dispensed with. Indeed, the full quotation ends
with an imperative: “The rest is commentary — [and now] go study.”11
But as modern buyers, we are often like the impatient gentile demanding to learn everything in just a few moments. Whether we are standing
at a rental car counter, enrolling to buy 99-cent songs from iTunes, or
even closing on a mortgage, the vast majority of us want to contract
quickly. Because nondrafters’ conversational tolerance for details is extremely limited, in many contexts Kar and Radin’s enforcement standard would severely limit the length of contracts without regard to the
substance of their terms. Kar and Radin appear to view this as a good
thing. We are not so sure.
Part I of this Response criticizes as arbitrary and essentializing Kar
and Radin’s insistence of shared meaning as the core of contracting.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6
7
8
9

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151.
See, e.g., id. at 1182–92 (criticizing Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s argument for textualism
and identifying examples in which context evidence might improve the accuracy of interpretation
in contracts between sophisticated parties); id. at 1196–203 (collecting doctrinal tools courts use to
prevent adhesive contracts from overriding the parties’ actual communications, and emphasizing
the potential power of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3)).
10 See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939).
11 Philologos, supra note 1.
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Part II argues that even if shared meaning were the sine qua non of
contracting, their proposal fails to achieve it because it does not assure
that the terms would be “cooperatively communicated.” Part III argues
that the proposed enforcement standard would, in practice, severely
limit freedom of contract and likely reduce consumer welfare.
I. ESSENTIALIZING SHARED MEANING
Kar and Radin criticize those who seek “to assimilate all boilerplate
text to ‘contract’ so long as it is delivered with actual or merely constructive ‘notice’ to a party who agrees to a more basic transaction.”12
The authors appropriately single out Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill v. Gateway 200013 as a classic statement of this “assimilationist” approach: “A contract need not be read to be effective; people who
accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome.”14
Kar and Radin maintain that “assimilationist approaches have not
yet offered a fully workable or coherent alternative to centering contract
interpretation on the common meaning of the parties.”15 Their core
criticism is that assimilationists fail to limit enforcement to terms cooperatively communicated to the buyers.16 “The premises of freedom of
contract — and also freedom from contract — suppose parties with
equal capacities to define and enter into only those terms that both agree
offer expected gains for each.”17 The article abstract states that “actual
agreement” is “required by core contract law principles.”18 If assent to
communicated terms is the bedrock of valid contractual enforcement,
assimilationist approaches must fail, as they call for enforcement of predictably unread, and hence uncommunicated and non-agreed-upon,
terms.
A distinctive feature of contractual obligations is that they are both
voluntary and chosen. Contractual obligations are voluntary in the
sense that the parties must agree to them, unlike most duties found in
tort or criminal law. Contractual obligations are chosen in the sense
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12
13
14
15

Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1139.
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1143 n.19 (quoting Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148).
Id. at 1156; see also id. at 1143 (“Nor have assimilationists advanced any adequate normative
theory for why contract formation by means of assumption of risk by noncognizant parties ought
to replace traditional contract, with its basis in actual agreement with shared meaning.”).
16 Id. at 1139–40 (“Assimilationists assume that all boilerplate text serves the same essentially
contractual function, and they do not recognize the critical difference between terms that parties
cooperatively communicate and agree to during contract formation and the increasingly copious
boilerplate text that is merely tacked onto that agreement but never read.”).
17 Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1139 (“[A]n actual agreement with common meaning is central to
the normative justification of contract.”).
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that the parties get to decide for themselves the content of the obligations. This distinguishes contractual duties from those that attach, say,
to a political office, military service, marriage, or a fiduciary — duties
voluntarily acquired but difficult or impossible to alter.19
It does not follow, however, that “[t]he premises of freedom of contract” require that the parties actively choose, or even comprehend, all
terms to which they agree. If a contract is the whole of the legal relationship between the parties that results from formation, then contracts
regularly include terms that the parties have not communicated and to
which they have not “actually agreed.” Default terms apply precisely
when the parties have not reached an agreement to the contrary. Mandatory terms apply even in the face of the parties’ contrary agreement.
And many rules of contract construction — contra proferentem, interpretations favoring the public interest, formalities like “F.O.B.” or “as
is” — look beyond what was actually communicated or the parties’ actual agreement. Such nonchosen terms do not threaten freedom of contract. Although the parties have not agreed to them individually, they
have assented to the transaction as a whole. That assent, which renders
contractual obligations voluntary if not all individually chosen, can do
a lot of normative work.20
This is not to deny the important differences between legislatively or
judicially created default and mandatory terms and standard terms that
one party drafts and gives to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
There are reasons to scrutinize the latter that do not apply to the former.
Our point is merely that the core principles of contract law do not obviously require actual agreement to or understanding of all terms. The
claim that choice of all terms is essential to contracting is not true to the
phenomena.
Kar and Radin level a separate, and to our minds even less persuasive, criticism of the so-called assimilationist approach: that it is “[l]inguistically [i]ndeterminate.”21 To explain why, they point to several examples of unread terms in the iTunes online terms and conditions, such
as: “If you see content submitted to the Apple Music Service that does
not comply with these Guidelines, [then] use the Report a Concern feature.”22 The authors treat the discovery of such provisions as strong
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19 See Gregory Klass, What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 93, 101–08 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds.,
2016).
20 For two very different examples, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 634–36 (2002) (argument based on an autonomy-based consent theory);
and Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (2006) (arguing that apparently one-sided unread terms can in
fact enhance consumer welfare).
21 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1160.
22 Id. at 1162.
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evidence of the failure of the assimilationist approach — claiming that
Judge Easterbrook’s position “start[s] to look strange” in light of them.23
Kar and Radin’s argument is subtle, but we take the claim to be twofold.
First, they emphasize that instructions like the above have the same ifthen structure as sentences that add terms, such as, “If you paint my
house, then I will pay you $1000.”24 An exclusive focus on semantic
meaning — “sentence meaning” — does not therefore differentiate between sentences that add terms and those that are mere instructions.25
In order to mark the difference, one must recur to linguistic norms of
cooperation, the very norms that, according to Kar and Radin, assimilationists themselves ignore or reject. Assimilationists have therefore
failed to explain “how courts are supposed to translate boilerplate ifthen statements like these into ‘contract meanings.’”26 Second, the examples belie the assimilationist claim that “all boilerplate text found
under the contemporary label of ‘terms and conditions’ is being assigned
a ‘contract meaning’ and treated by everyone as adding ‘terms’ to a
‘contract’ once a consumer clicks ‘I accept.’”27
We find ourselves baffled by both claims. As Kar and Radin observe
in a footnote, when using “a fully ‘textualist’ or ‘four corners’ approach
to interpretation, courts often do and must implicitly rely on conversational implicatures to identify even the ‘plain meaning’ of text.”28 Even
the most textualist of courts regularly intone, a contractual writing
should be “read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent.”29 It
strikes us as fairly straightforward to differentiate between the instructions and terms in the iTunes terms and conditions, as illustrated by Kar
and Radin’s own puzzlement at the idea that obvious instructions might
be treated as terms.30 Doing so does not require applying the shared
meaning analysis Kar and Radin advocate — focusing only on language
that could have been communicated in an oral conversation. Meaning
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1183 n.139.
W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990); see also, e.g., Empire
Props. Corp. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 25, 28 (N.Y. 1942) (“The meaning of a writing may be
distorted where undue force is given to single words or phrases. We read the writing as a whole.
We seek to give to each clause its intended purpose in the promotion of the primary and dominant
purpose of the contract.”).
30 See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1164 (suggesting that trying to give contractual meaning to
instructional provisions would lead to “ludicrous” and “absurd[]” results); id. at 1208 (noting with
respect to provision, “You can disable an app’s access [to Apple Music] on your iOS device in Settings,” and arguing “[n]o one would think that Apple had actually breached the resulting contract
if its developers were, for instance, to come up with an easier and more user-friendly way to disable
an app’s access without going to Settings and could therefore eliminate the Settings bar altogether
in a useful software update”).
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happens in nonconversational contexts too. Identifying it requires
simply making sense of words in the context in which they appear, reading a document as a whole, and applying the principle of charity.31
Nor do we understand the grounds on which Kar and Radin attribute to their opponents a “blanket assumption that all boilerplate text
conveyed during contract formation must seek to add terms to a contract.”32 We know of no theorist who makes such a claim. Nor can we
think of any reason why someone who advocates enforcing unread, or
even unreadable terms, must assume that every word in a document
labeled “terms and conditions” should designate a contract term.
Perhaps Kar and Radin are concerned about the label “terms and
conditions.” They write: “Apple is offering a mere instruction for use
even though the instruction is presented under the misleading label of
‘terms and conditions.’”33 We grant that Apple’s lawyers could have
chosen a more descriptive title. But it is odd for Kar and Radin to
complain that it is misleading. As noted above, they too find it easy to
differentiate between instructions and terms. Nor do they point to any
evidence of consumer confusion. And we think there are good reasons
to mix terms and instructions in a single document. In a world where
few nondrafters bother reading standard terms ex ante, it becomes all
the more natural to include instructions to guide the subset of those who
consult them ex post. We do not expect new car buyers to read all of
their owner’s manual before using the car. Terms and conditions, like
owner’s manuals, are often best consulted when particular problems
arise. Including instructions in them strikes us as not only unproblematic, but beneficial.
II. FAILING TO ASSURE SHARED MEANING
We believe the core risk of adhesive contracts, including consumer
contracts, is drafter overreach. Knowing the nondrafting party is unlikely to read, the drafter is tempted to include terms to which the nondrafting party would object if they were brought to her attention —
terms that are unfair or inefficient. In addition to harming the nondrafting party, the widespread use of such terms can also have negative
social consequences — a case Radin has made forcefully elsewhere.34
One finds in the law two nonexclusive approaches to addressing this
risk. The first, procedural approach attempts to secure consumer comprehension of terms, on the theory that consumers can be trusted to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 See DONALD DAVIDSON, Radical Interpretation, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 125 (2001).
32 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1209; see also id. at 1208 (“[P]lacing noncontractual boilerplate
text under a misleading label like ‘terms and conditions’ can only cause obfuscation.”).
33 Id. at 1165.
34 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–51 (2013).
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recognize unfair terms if they only know that they are there. The second, substantive approach relies on scrutiny of the content of the terms.
That scrutiny might employ ex ante regulatory mechanisms such as
black or grey list, or it might rely on ex post review against a standard
such as substantive unconscionability.
Kar and Radin themselves emphasize the risk of unfairness to nondrafting parties. To the extent that their proposed test seeks to address
it, it would appear to represent a modified version of the procedural
approach. Their core premise is that “parties with equal capacities [will]
define and enter into only those terms that both agree offer expected
gains for each.”35 Unlike other procedural proposals, however, Kar and
Radin do not advocate securing nondrafter comprehension of important
boilerplate terms. They view that project as hopeless.36 Instead, they
would radically cut back the effective boilerplate language to that which
could have been communicated in a conversation.37
But the proposed “face-to-face conversation” test does not assure that
enforcement is limited to terms the nondrafting party actually understands.38 Kar and Radin recommend that with respect to disputed boilerplate text, courts ask the following question:
Could this boilerplate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conversation that contributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposition
that both parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern language use to form a contract?
Any boilerplate text that meets this test falls within the correct boundary of
parties’ actual agreement for a contract, and courts can rely on their
ordinary linguistic intuitions to interpret the contract meaning of the text.
Otherwise the boilerplate text is mere pseudo-contract, which does not contribute to the common meaning of the parties and should not be enforced.39

Although the above test uses the words “actual agreement,” it
appears not to require that a term actually be communicated to the nondrafting party — there is no expectation that the nondrafting party
actually read the term. All that is necessary is that it be conveyed in “a
sufficiently cooperative manner” such that parties’ common meaning is
created.40 Nor do Kar and Radin present any evidence that nondrafting
parties are more likely to read and comprehend boilerplate text that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
35
36

Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1161.
See id. at 1171–72 (citing OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 169 (2014)). For a trenchant
critique of Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s use of evidence and mode of argument, see Richard
Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 88
WASH. L. REV. 333 (2013).
37 See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1172, 1175.
38 See id. at 1176–77.
39 Id. at 1167 (footnote omitted).
40 Id. at 1155.
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passes their test.41 Although Kar and Radin criticize those who would
enforce boilerplate terms, “so long as [the text] is delivered with actual
or merely constructive ‘notice,’”42 their preferred rule in fact merely sets
out a different, higher standard for what constitutes constructive notice.
The test does not eliminate “the so-called ‘duty-to-read’” doctrine, which
holds nondrafters to unread terms. It merely limits which unread terms
will be enforced.43
We agree that the correct test cannot be actual agreement. Limiting
enforcement to terms that have been actually communicated or agreed
upon (objectively considered) would wreak havoc on contract doctrine.
As we noted above, many rules of contract construction — default
terms, mandatory terms, contra proferentem, and so forth — generate
terms in the absence of, and sometimes despite, the parties’ actual agreement to them.
But this causes us to wonder about the purposes and implications of
the proposed test. Whereas actual comprehension by a critical mass of
nondrafters can, at least in theory, serve to discipline drafters,44 potential
comprehension does not. Without an argument that nondrafters are
more likely to read terms that pass their proposed test, there is little
reason to think that Kar and Radin’s proposal will address the risks
adhesive contracts pose.
If the test is meant to serve a purpose other than securing fair or
efficient terms — if it comes from, say, a more abstract commitment to
what freedom of contract requires — we wonder about its implications.
What, for example, does it say about how the law establishes and communicates default terms?45 Does section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code sufficiently convey the implied warranty of merchantability to
make it part of the shared meaning of a contract for the sale of goods?46
And according to the proposed test, the question is not whether individual sections of Article Two might have been effectively communicated
in conversation, but whether all the enforceable terms could have been.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 For a dramatic illustration of how difficult it can be to secure consumer comprehension, see
Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test,
45 J. LEGAL STUD. 541 (2016) (finding that warning boxes highlighting terms many consumers
might find important had little effect on consumer comprehension, decision making, or understanding of their legal rights).
42 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1139.
43 Id. at 1182 (“If courts are interested in discerning the common meaning of the parties and
correctly identifying the scope of their actual agreements, then the so-called ‘duty to read’ should
be limited to text that was cooperatively communicated.”).
44 For a classic statement of this claim, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
630, 643–46 (1979).
45 Kar and Radin acknowledge the existence of default rules and other noninterpretive rules of
construction. See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1138 n.2. They do not explain, however, why those
rules should be exempt from their proposed test.
46 U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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Clearly the default terms contained in Article Two, plus the raft of judicial decisions comprising the common law of contracts, fail that test.
But if unread and uncooperatively conveyed provisions of the Code and
relevant caselaw can become part of the parties’ shared meaning, why
can substantively reasonable boilerplate terms not also become part of
the parties’ shared meaning?
To repeat, we do not mean to assimilate terms drafted by one party
and given to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to legislatively or
judicially established defaults. But the conceptual apparatus Kar and
Radin use has implications they do not address. Or to put the same
point a different way, their conceptual apparatus does not capture what
is truly worrisome about contracts of adhesion — the risks of opportunism and unfairness that come with terms drafted by one party and given
to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We would do better by focusing on those risks, rather than the form in which nonsalient terms are
provided.
III. CRYPTO-MANDATORY RULES AND CONSUMER WELFARE
Kar and Radin claim that their approach “is not a form of paternalism or market regulation.”47 We disagree. In fact, their approach would
prevent buyers from taking a reasonable risk on unread boilerplate. The
authors analogously argue that “utilizing shared meaning analysis would
not interfere with freedom of contract.”48 This claim borders on the
disingenuous. Although shared meaning analysis does not impose specific, substantive mandatory rules, its procedural mandate has important substantive consequences. It is therefore best understood as a
covert or crypto-mandatory rule.
First, although there are circumstances in which parties might reasonably want to take on the risk of unread terms, Kar and Radin’s proposal would deny them the ability to do so. Technological changes have
radically expanded the use of standard terms. But technology has also
expanded the possibility of reputational disciplining of sellers’ boilerplate. A “bug me not” consumer renting from Avis or licensing from
Apple might rationally prefer a streamlined contracting process, knowing that social media would likely uncover and bring to bear public
pressure on any untoward terms. Assuming the risk is all the more
reasonable when a buyer takes into account the protection afforded by
the doctrine of unconscionability and other doctrines that limit the enforceability of substantively unreasonable standard terms — doctrines
that Kar and Radin themselves helpfully collect and summarize.49
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47
48
49

Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1172.
Id. at 1178.
See id. at 1197–202.
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Second, Kar and Radin give insufficient attention to the possibility
that terms that do not pass their proposed test can increase aggregate
consumer welfare. Even if a subset of contractors ends up being bound
by terms to which they would never have agreed, it is still possible that
enforcing unread terms produces transaction cost savings that on net
increase nondrafter welfare. Judge Easterbrook in Hill memorably captured just this idea:
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before
ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms
before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up
in a rage over the waste of their time. . . . Customers as a group are better
off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.50

Standard terms save drafters money, which in competitive markets
can benefit nondrafters in the form of lower prices. A nondrafter might
find it in her interest to roll the dice on being among a majority of those
that receive that benefit. Again, Kar and Radin’s approach would prevent her from doing so.
Third, the proposed test could prevent terms that directly benefit
consumers. In practice, the “face-to-face conversation” test would work
as a complexity-limiting device. Drafters attempting to contract around
default rights and duties would be severely limited in the number of
provisions that could be altered — perhaps to two or three. The shared
meaning approach would therefore result in a regime in which almost
all default terms become mandatory. One suspects that this complexitylimiting feature is an intended consequence of Kar and Radin’s enterprise — a feature, not a bug. But the proposed test would also deny
enforcement to boilerplate terms that are unexpectedly generous relative
to the legal default or to the buyer’s beliefs.51 And sometimes complexity is necessary to secure real benefits for the nondrafting party.
Consider the margin rate currently offered by Interactive Brokers,
an electronic trading platform.52 Whereas at this writing Fidelity and
Schwab were charging 9.32% interest to customers buying stock on margin, Interactive Brokers was charging an interest rate of just 3.90%.53
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50
51

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545, 578, 583 n.94, 598 n.140, 605 (2014) (discussing examples where a majority of
consumers expected less favorable terms than those included in the actual agreement).
52 One of us has extolled the use of Interactive Brokers. See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF,
LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE
PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO (2010).
53 See Online Brokers, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/
index.php?f=1340 [https://perma.cc/7E38-VLSX].
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One reason that its margin rate is so much lower is that the company
has contractually dispensed with the tradition of “margin calls” after
prespecified drops in the margined stock’s price (where brokers would
telephonically call their margin customers and give them the option of
adding additional funds to their account to avoid involuntary liquidation of the margined position).54 Under Kar and Radin’s proposal, a
seller who wanted to engage in such contractual innovation would face
substantial risk: a court might later conclude that the language it used
to describe this term could not have plausibly contributed to an oral
conversation under cooperative norms.
Kar and Radin ominously claim that “market forces have begun to
interact with assimilationist legal doctrine to create powerful incentives
for businesses systematically to mislead consumers.”55 To be sure, boilerplate at times hurts nondrafters. The low-salience, “shrouded” pricing
of back-end fees is a vivid example.56 But the implied claim that assimilationist enforcement hurts nondrafters more than it helps them is unsubstantiated. The enforcement of boilerplate that meets the ex post
fairness test of unconscionability and associated doctrines, as well as the
disciplinary reputational tests of social media, leaves considerable room
for contractual creativity. That is not to say that the current protections
are enough. Where there are systematic problems, for example, ex ante
regulation of terms should perhaps step in, as the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau attempted to do with respect to class arbitration
waivers.57 A contractual regime that imposed the further limits of
shared meaning analysis, however, would be a world in which innovative, contractually structured products like Interactive Brokers, Uber,
and Airbnb would be less likely to exist.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54 See INTERACTIVE BROKERS, DISCLOSURE OF RISKS OF MARGIN TRADING 1 (Mar. 10,
2015), https://gdcdyn.interactivebrokers.com/Universal/servlet/Registration.formSampleView?file=
registration_1/margin_trading_risk_disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/B2SB-FQEL] (“You should
understand that pursuant to the IB Margin Agreement, IB generally will not issue margin calls,
that IB will not credit your account to meet intraday margin deficiencies, and that IB generally will
liquidate positions in your account in order to satisfy margin requirements without prior notice to
you and without an opportunity for you to choose the positions to be liquidated or the timing or
order of liquidation.”).
55 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1196.
56 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–08 (2006); see also Sendhil
Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study 11, 14, 17 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028263
[https://perma.cc/K7UV-X9JR].
57 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830 (May 24, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040
(2017)), rendered ineffective by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
Almost half a century ago, Professor Arthur Leff suggested that we
think of consumer contracts not as agreements, but as things that businesses market to the public, which like an automobile or other technological good, a person might purchase without fully understanding how
it works.58 Like Kar and Radin, Leff argued that it was a category
mistake to lump such consumer contracts of adhesion together with fully
negotiated contracts. But Leff’s solution was very different. Rather
than excising what was not part of the actual agreement, Leff recommended regulating consumer contracts like any other consumer product.59 Viewed from this perspective, Kar and Radin’s proposal looks
like a form of Luddism. Rather than regulating complex adhesive contracts for fairness, safety, and social benefit, Kar and Radin would lop
off that which is too complex. The equivalent in the product safety
realm would be requiring auto manufacturers to go back to the horse
and buggy.
In the end, Kar and Radin’s analysis seems too divorced from realworld consequences. They choose formal abstractions — and at times
moving poetry60 — over practical policy analysis. The decisions concerning whether and when to enforce boilerplate text can impact social
welfare. We too worry that buyers would not have purchased many
items if they had known the details of unread terms. But we also wonder whether different enforcement rules might more effectively harness
competition to produce better offers. What we want are rules that, on
net, both increase consumer autonomy and enhance the gains of trade.
We believe Kar and Radin’s shared-meaning approach is too indirect a
route to get us there.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
58
59

Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
“When things are too dangerous or too worthless the government does directly intervene.
There is no reason why that intervention should not take place as directly with respect to contracty
things.” Id. at 155. This is not to say that we agree with all of Leff’s regulatory approaches, such
as the use of warning labels, id. at 153–55. Our understanding of which regulatory techniques work
has grown since 1970.
60 See, e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1208 (“The tree of contract is getting lost in an expanding forest of pseudo-contract, and the forest is being mistaken for the tree.”).

